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THE ALI CHILD SUPPORT PRINCIPLES: INCREMENTAL CHANGES TO
IMPROVE THE LOT OF CHILDREN AND RESIDENTIAL PARENTS
LESLIE JOAN HARRIS*

I. INTRODUCTION
For the last quarter-century child support has been one of the most highprofile issues in family law. Because of the high rate of divorce among families
1
2
with children and the high incidence of births to unmarried women, the number of families in which support may be ordered is high. Moreover, the large
number of divorces and out-of-marriage births is intrinsically related to one of
3
today’s pressing social problems, the high rate of poverty among children.
Child support is widely regarded as one of the major solutions to this problem.
This view is based on two policy assumptions. The first is that providing
for dependent children is principally a private obligation, rather than one shared
by the society as a whole. While we recognize a general societal obligation to
help poor children, welfare is only reluctantly provided as a backup when fami4
lies do not support children adequately. The second is that biological (and
adoptive) parents are obliged to support children, regardless of whether the
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1. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 26 (1992) (stating that during the
late 1970s and 1980s, about two-fifths of all children will experience their parents’ divorce by age 16);
SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT
HELPS 2 (1994) (stating that in 1984, 45 percent of children younger than 18 will experience their parents’ divorce).
2. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 1, at 2.
3. In 1997, children under six living with a female single parent had a poverty rate of about 60
percent; in comparison, the poverty rate for married-couple families was about 11 percent. JOSEPH
DALAKER & MARY NAIFEH, BUREAU OF CENSUS, US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1997, vi (1997); see also Jay D. Teachman & Kathleen M. Paasch, Financial Impact of Divorce on
Children and Their Families, 4 - 1 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN—CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 63, 64 (Spring
1994) (1991 population survey data indicate that divorced women with children have a high likelihood of living in poverty; 39 percent of all divorced women with children and 55 percent of those
with children under six were poor in 1991); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part II, 1998) [hereinafter ALI
PRINCIPLES 1998] (“The risk of poverty is comparably high for children in one-parent households in
all wealthy Western countries. When private resources alone are considered, cross national studies
show notable similarity in the economic circumstances of one-parent families.”).
4. The 1996 federal welfare statute eliminated welfare as an entitlement and imposes stringent
work obligations on parents of even very young children. See Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1997) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 602, 607-608 (1999)).
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parents and children live together, and that other adults ordinarily have no obligation, regardless of whether they live or have lived with the children. While
either or both of these assumptions can be and have been challenged, the child
support provisions of the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution accept these assumptions and focus on defining how children can be adequately supported by
their parents when the parents no longer live or have never lived in the same
5
household as their children.
The Principles are a substantial improvement over the child support guidelines in most states today because they offer a principled structure for deciding
how much child support a non-residential parent should pay, as well as powerful arguments for increasing support levels. They acknowledge conflicts that
arise between the interests of the child and the parents in the course of deter6
mining child support and seek justifiable balances among these interests. In
practice, however, most of the tensions which the Principles identify are between
the interests of the non-residential parent and the child or residential parent.
The economic interests of the residential parent and the child rarely diverge,
7
since they live in the same household.
Both men and women are parents, and both can be residential and nonresidential parents. However, most of the time children live with their mothers.
Thus it makes sense to think about the Principles as if the residential parent is the
mother and the non-residential parent is the father. While drafted in genderneutral terms and with express concern for the interests of non-residential parents, the Principles express policies more favorable to residential parents than
currently exist in many jurisdictions. However, in application, many of the advantages that the Principles would provide residential parents would accrue to
middle and upper-class parents, without addressing the most pressing needs of
poorer residential parents and their children.
After describing the criticism of existing child support guidelines, this
commentary outlines and critiques the Principles’ approach to child support, focusing on the basic support formula, provisions that affect parents’ choices re5. The Principles apply to all child support cases, not just those following the divorce of a
child’s parents. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.01. Federal law requires that state child support guidelines be of general applicability and apply to all cases. See Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) Under the
Principles, an unmarried mother may seek child support from a father who has not been involved
with the child with less fear that he will then be able to demand visitation, since Section 2.09 provides that such a father is not entitled to guaranteed contact with the child. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].
6. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.03.
7. Like the child support guidelines of many states, the ALI Principles treat as a “standard
case” one in which the child lives with one parent at least 65 percent of the time. They make adaptations for “dual residence” cases. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.14 cmt. b, reporter’s note at
120. For dual residence cases, those in which time is divided between the parents more equally than
65 percent-35 percent, the Principles call for dividing the amount of support according to the amount
of time the child spends with each parent. Id. § 3.14. The total amount due for support is increased,
in recognition of the increased costs of dual residences, and the amount to be paid is calculated in a
way that preserves the idea of supplementing the basic child support award to insure that the child’s
basic needs are met and that the child has an income not grossly disproportionate to that of either
parent. Id.
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garding work, school and childcare, and treatment of parents’ previous and new
families. The final section considers whether the advantages offered by the
Principles are worth the political effort that would be required to get them
adopted, and considers alternatives.
II. CRITICISM OF EXISTING CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
Current child support guidelines in the United States are generally based
on the principle that parents should pay as much of their income as they would
spend if the child lived with both parents in the same household (the hypothetical intact household). This amount is determined by asking how much it would
cost these parents to maintain their prior standard of living if they added a child
8
to their household. Where the child does not live with both parents, each parent
is expected to contribute to the total amount in proportion to his or her income.
The non-residential parent’s obligation is determined by multiplying the
amount of the combined child support obligation of both parents by a fraction,
the numerator of which is the non-residential parent’s income and the denomi9
nator of which is the combined income of both parents.
In application, child support guidelines in most states have not increased
10
the size of child support awards as much as expected and so have not contributed as much as hoped to the reduction of poverty among children. But, as
critics of existing guidelines have pointed out, there was no particular reason to
expect that the guidelines would produce awards that satisfy the needs of the
child(ren) because they do not take into account the actual economic conditions
11
in the household in which the child(ren) actually live. They are, instead, based
on a hypothetical situation in which the income of both the child(ren)’s parents
8. See id. § 3.05 cmt. c. The reduction factor used in comment c assumes that the amount varies
with the total income of the parents, based on economic studies of how much families at various
economic levels spend on their children. See id.
9. In some states, the non-residential parent’s child support duty is calculated as a fraction of
his or her income without consideration of the residential parent’s income. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Reporter’s Memorandum to The Members of the Institute, ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, at xxix
n.5. Most states, however, use the Income Shares model, which provides that the non-residential
parent’s obligation is a function of the combined incomes of both parents. See id. As a practical
matter, under a pure version of this approach, the amount of the residential parent’s income does
not significantly affect the amount of the non-residential parent’s child support obligation. See id.;
Leslie J. Harris, The Proposed ALI Child Support Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 717, 723 (1999)
(giving an example and an explanation of why the non-residential parent’s child support is based on
the income of both parents).
10. See Jessica Pearson, Nancy Thoennes, & Patricia Tjaden, Legislating Adequacy: The Impact of
Child Support Guidelines, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 569, 585 (1989) (study of child support awards before
and after guidelines in three states, found “a modest post-guidelines increase of 15 percent”); Nancy
Thoennes, P. Tjarden, and J. Pearson, The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award
Variability and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L. Q. 325, 342-44 (1991) (stating that the average
monthly award increased 5 percent in Colorado, 28 percent in Hawaii and 16 percent in Illinois).
Data from all the states combined shows that low-income, single-child maternal custody families
experienced a 19 percent increase in award levels following adoption of the guidelines, while middle- and upper-income families experienced a 7 percent and a 13 percent increase respectively. Id.
11. Blumberg, supra note 9, at xxix.
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supports only the parents and the child(ren) in only one household. In fact, the
income of the child(ren)’s residential parent may be significantly different from
(and often is significantly lower than) that of the non-residential parent, and either or both households may have additional members. Thus, the standards of
living in the two households may be very different from each other and from
that of the hypothetical intact household.
In response to these criticisms, the ALI child support provisions, while still
based on the Income Shares model, evaluate the need for and adequacy of child
support awards by comparing the economic standards of living in the households of the parents. Where the household of the residential parent has a significantly lower standard of living, the Principles call for increased child support
to narrow the gap; where the residential parent’s household has a significantly
higher standard of living, child support is lower.
The Principles accept as a starting place the proposition that underlies most
existing child support formulas—that the non-residential parent has a superior
claim to his earnings and an interest in limiting his contribution to the support
of the children to what he would spend if he were living with the children in a
12
two-parent household. The difficulty with this proposition is that it holds the
non-residential parent harmless against the costs of multiple households and
imposes all the costs on the residential parent and child. For this reason, the
guidelines proposed by the Principles do not fully protect this interest of the nonresidential parent.
The main interest of the residential parent recognized by the Principles is
the avoidance of a disproportionate share of the direct and indirect costs of child
13
rearing. These costs include not only money spent on providing for the child,
14
but also loss of market earnings because of childcare obligations. In considering the child’s interests, the Principles do not recognize two common aspirations
about protecting children—that a child should not suffer economically because
the parents are not living together, and that a child should not suffer disproportionately as compared to other family members. The Principles argue that attempting to achieve either goal would infringe upon the rights of the non15
residential parent too much. Instead, the Principles suggest that the goals of the
child support formula should be to: 1) allow the child to “enjoy a minimum decent standard of living when the resources of both parents together are sufficient
16
to achieve such result without impoverishing either parent;” 2) allow the child
to “enjoy a standard of living not grossly inferior to that of the child’s higher in17
come parent;” and 3) prevent the child from suffering “loss of important life

12. ALI Principles 1998, supra note 3, § 3.03 cmt. e.
13. Id. § 3.03 cmt d.
14. Id. Section 5.06 of the Principles provides that compensation in the form of spousal support
may be justified for a former spouse who has lost earning capacity because of “his or her disproportionate share during marriage of the care of the marital children, or of the children of either spouse.”
Id. § 5.06.
15. Id. § 3.03 cmt. c.
16. Id. § 3.03(1)(b). The Principles use the concept of “minimum decent standard of living” for
various purposes and define it as 150 percent of the federal poverty threshold. ALI Principles 1998,
supra note 3, glossary at 165.
17. Id. § 3.03(1)(b).
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opportunities that the parents are able to provide without undue hardship to
18
themselves or their other dependents.”
The tension among these interests runs throughout the child support provisions of the Principles. The next two portions of this paper consider the most
important ALI sections, which develop the essential parts of the child support
formula.
III. CALCULATION OF THE BASIC CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION UNDER
THE ALI PRINCIPLES
The balance among the interests of the child and parents is expressed most
fundamentally in the basic child support formula. The Principles advocate for a
formula that will increase the amount of child support owed in most cases.
However, because of the Principles’ treatment of childcare expenses, in application the Principles will sometimes fail to achieve this goal.
The first step in applying the ALI guidelines is to establish a “base amount”
of child support owed, the amount that would be required under a wellconstructed income shares formula. However, the Principles argue that the interests of the parents and child are in balance only when the parents have the
same incomes. When the residential parent’s income is lower than the nonresidential parent’s (as is often true) the typical formula does not produce an
award large enough to allow the child to “enjoy a standard of living not grossly
19
inferior to that of the child’s higher income parent;” and to prevent the child
from suffering “loss of important life opportunities that the parents are economically able to provide without undue hardship to themselves or their other
20
dependents.” Sometimes the basic award does not even provide the child with
a “minimum decent standard of living,” even though the non-residential par21
ent’s income may be sufficient enough to meet this goal.
Therefore, the Principles provide that an additional sum, the “supplement”
should be added to the base amount to produce an award that partially compensates for the disparity in standards of living of the two households. The sum
of the base and the supplement is the “preliminary assessment,” which never
22
exceeds half the support obligor’s net income. The preliminary assessment is
the highest amount that a non-residential parent would ordinarily be expected
to pay.
The Principles argue that if the parents have equal incomes, the base
amount appropriately balances the interests of the child and the parents because
it equalizes the standard of living in the two households. Therefore, the preliminary assessment must be reduced to eliminate the supplement when the
parents’ incomes are equal, and the supplement must be gradually reduced as
the residential parent’s income rises. The “reduction mechanism” accomplishes
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 3.03(2).
Id. §3.03(1)(b).
Id. § 3.03(2).
Id. § 3.03(1)(a).
ALI Principles 1998, supra note 3, § 3.05 cmt. g.
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23

these purposes, though it does not operate until the residential parent’s income
is more than enough to insure the parent a “minimally decent standard of liv24
ing.”
To understand fully how the ALI formula works, its treatment of childcare
costs must also be considered, since the non-residential parent’s share of those
costs is folded into the supplement. Child support guidelines today usually
provide that the parents should contribute to actual costs of childcare in propor25
tion to their incomes. In contrast, under the Principles, the non-residential parent’s share is included in the child support he pays, and the residential parent
pays for actual childcare costs from her income and the child support. Thus, the
amount the non-residential parent pays in child support is the same, regardless
26
of the actual childcare costs.
Because of this treatment of childcare costs, in practice the ALI child support guidelines may not greatly increase the amount of child support that some
residential parents receive, in comparison to how much they receive under current guidelines. For example, consider a family in which the mother has custody of the only child and a net income of $1,000, while the father has a net income of $2,000. The ALI Principles provide that the father owes child support of
$680, and the mother pays all costs of childcare. If the cost were $200 per month,
the mother’s household would have a net monthly income of $1,000 + $680 $200 = $1,480. Under a typical Income Shares model, in which childcare costs
are allocated separately, the mother’s monthly net income would be $1,366. If
childcare costs $300 per month, the mother would net $1,405 under the ALI for27
mula. Under the Income Shares model, she would have $1,433 net income.
Which of the formulas produces greater total awards depends on the parents’ incomes and the actual cost of childcare. The ALI formula is less likely to
provide greater total awards for families with lower income levels and higher
childcare costs than the Income Shares model. It would be possible to increase
the supplement to increase the non-residential parent’s contribution to childcare.
However, this solution is inconsistent with the theoretical approach that under-

23. Id. § 3.05(4). The reduction mechanism actually goes further; for cases in which the residential parent’s income is greater than the non-residential parent’s, the reduction mechanism continues
to operate, reducing the child support award below what a typical formula would produce. Id. §
3.05(5).
24. Id. § 3.05(4).
25. This is how the Principles recommend treating medical costs, since they are so variable. Id. §
3.05(7). The Principles also give the fact finder discretion to apportion extraordinary costs such as
long-distance travel to exercise visitation rights and children’s expenses such as special tutoring for a
learning disability or private music lessons. Id. § 3.05.
26. A support obligor paying the full preliminary assessment does not pay more for childcare,
and the residential parent pays the full cost. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.05. If the residential parent’s income is high enough that the reduction mechanism is operating, the nonresidential parent’s share of childcare costs is offset against the reduction of the preliminary assessment. See id. § 3.05 cmt. j. The Principles cap the non-residential parent’s contribution to childcare
costs at the maximum amount of the reduction figure. Id. § 3.05(6). “This cap is likely to operate
only when the income of the residential parent is relatively low and childcare expenditure is relatively great, circumstances usually involving a very young child.” Id. § 3.05 cmt. j.
27. See Harris, supra note 9, at 741 (providing the example of a lower-income family where the
mother’s income is half that of the father’s).
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lies the Principles, and it would produce the undesirable result that a residential
parent who used little or no childcare would receive a windfall.
In actual practice the ALI Principles might not increase child support as
much as was hoped. This is especially true for families at lower income levels,
because of how childcare costs are treated and because non-residential parents
with low incomes will not be ordered to pay so much that they themselves are
28
impoverished.
IV. PROMOTING PARENTAL AUTONOMY—DECISIONS ABOUT WORK, EDUCATION
AND CHILDCARE
The ALI Principles support the autonomy of residential parents by allowing
them to decide whether to work, go to school or provide childcare personally, so
long as their choices are reasonable. However, economic necessity requires
many residential parents to work, so that the choice offered by the Principles is,
for them, only theoretical.
Like existing rules in many states, the Principles provide that when a parent
is voluntarily under- or unemployed and could reasonably be expected to earn
more, a fact finder should treat that parent as having the income he or she could
29
earn, based on his or her demonstrated earning capacity. However, the Principles state that earnings should not be imputed to a parent who pursues “education, training, or retraining in order to improve employment skills so long as the
pursuit is not unreasonable in light of the circumstances and the parent’s responsibility for dependents,” or who changes jobs “so long as the child support
award based upon the parent’s employment in the new occupation does not unreasonably reduce the child’s standard of living taking into account the child’s
30
total economic circumstances.” These standards, while applicable to both parents, could be particularly helpful to residential parents who need to upgrade

28. The Principles protect obligors with incomes below 150 percent of the federal poverty level
through use of a self-support reserve. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.05. Other child support
formulas also use self-support reserves. Id. § 3.09.
29. Id. § 3.12(5). The Principles provide that if income is imputed to a residential parent, the
maximum amount that should be imputed is “an amount that, in combination with the residential
parent’s actual income, does not exceed the income of the non-residential parent.” Id. § 3.06(4).
Thus, the maximum effect of imputing income to the residential parent is to treat her as having income equal to that of the non-residential parent, which eliminates the supplement but does not cut
into the base amount of child support. The rationale for the limitation, apparently, is that imputing
income to the residential parent is will insure that the supplement is not claimed when the assumptions upon which it is based are absent. See id. § 3.06(4) cmt. d. However, even this cap can be
waived when the fact finder thinks it is equitable. See generally LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE TEITELBAUM,
FAMILY LAW 582-83, 619-25 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the treatment of unemployed and underemployed parents). The Principles acknowledge that imputing income to the residential parent does not
promote the interests of the child. The income-imputing rules are justified as protecting the interests
of the non-residential parent. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.12 cmt. e.
30. Id. § 3.12(a), (b). Current state law varies in its treatment of this issue. In a few states, no
voluntary reduction in income is regarded as legitimate; in some the reduction is legitimate if in
good faith, and in others the court balances the advantage to the obligor against the adverse impact
on the persons owed support. See generally HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 29, at 619-25.
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their skills. On the other hand, these provisions may also be invoked by nonresidential parents, thereby lowering the amount of child support they owe.
Unlike the rules in many states, the Principles provide that income should
not be imputed to a residential parent who is under-or unemployed because of
31
childcare responsibilities. For a child younger than six years old, the Principles
say that a residential parent should be able to remain out of the work force
without having income imputed.
The ALI guideline does not second guess the hard choices facing parents with
residential responsibility for preschool children. This abstention acknowledges
the difficulties of securing adequate day care and meeting employer expectations while serving as the residential parent of a young child. Although these
difficulties do not entirely disappear when a child enters school, they lessen
32
substantially at that point.

For older children, the ALI Principles generally presume that it is appropri33
ate for the residential parent to work, though the trier of fact has discretion to
find that such parents should not be expected to work full time or even to work
34
Moreover, the Principles should preclude imputing income to a parent
at all.
who takes a lower paying job because it offers a schedule more conducive to the
35
parent’s childcare responsibilities.
The ALI Principles’ treatment of childcare expense payments also promotes
the autonomy of the residential parent. The residential parent is free to decide
whether and how much to use childcare, without having to account to the nonresidential parent. On the other hand, in a recent article, the principal Reporter
of the ALI child support section explained the childcare provision in terms more
favorable to the non-residential parent. She wrote, “[The Principles acknowledge] that the cost of childcare is a form of child expenditure that should be
taken into account by the child support rules, but [they do] so in a manner that
requires the residential parent to internalize the entire cost of childcare and thus

31. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.12 (5)(c). Support payments to allow a parent to remain at home might also be characterized as spousal, rather than child support. However, it is uncommon for state law to authorize spousal support for this purpose. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 728-38 (1993).
32. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.06 cmt. b.
33. Id. § 3.06(1) cmt. b.
34. Id. § 3.12(5).
35. Further, the Principles caution that in deciding whether to impute income to the residential
parent, the fact finder “should take into account the relative economic situations of the parties. In
exercising its discretion to impute . . . income [to the residential parent], the trier of fact should additionally consider the benefit, if any, accruing to the children of the parties from the residential parent’s underemployment.” Id. § 3.06(5). The commentary adds, “The support obligor’s ‘shirking’ may
reflect an intent to avoid parental obligations; the residential parent’s ‘shirking’ may be motivated
instead by desire to provide the parties’ children with personal care. Imputation of earnings to the
support obligor serves to increase child support available in the residential household, while imputation of earnings to the residential parent may merely decrease that support. While both forms of
imputation should be approached with caution, imputation of earnings to the residential parent
should be approached with even more circumspection.” Id. § 3.06 cmt. b; see also id. § 3.12 cmt. e.
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to make efficient choices between gainful employment and the personal provi36
sion of childcare.”
In theory, the provisions which allow residential parents to make choices
regarding childcare, training and work options eliminate some recurring causes
for parental disputes over control and enhance the autonomy of residential parents. In reality, most mothers—whether married or single—work. Less than
half of all mothers of children younger than six stay at home with them full37
While some of these
time, and less than a third of single mothers do so.
women choose to work when they could afford to stay at home, most do not.
For a single mother to remain at home full-time with children or even to go to
school, she must either have enough wealth to provide for herself, access to educational loans, substantial spousal support, or very generous child support
payments. Spousal support is potentially available only to a mother who was
married to the child’s father. In rare cases, a mother may be entitled to support
payments as an ex-cohabitant, but even then the father must have a substantial
income before much support is ordered. Substantial child support payments
also depend on the non-residential parent having a substantial income. While
the ALI base plus supplement is intended to provide some money for the residential parent to remain at home with young children, many non-residential
parents’ incomes are so low that they would not be ordered to pay enough to
make this feasible.
Further, the Principles’ decision to fold a standardized amount for childcare
into the basic award (leaving it to the residential parent to decide whether and
how much childcare to purchase), could encourage residential parents to make
decisions that are not consistent with the best interests of the children or that are
not economically sound in the long-run. The Principles might encourage some
working residential parents to use cheap or no childcare, when they might use
care if the costs were clearly shared with the non-residential parent. The Principles also encourage mothers with limited work skills to care for children rather
than working because they cannot earn enough to pay for childcare and still
come out ahead economically. A parent in this position probably needs to improve her earning capacity by taking a job that offers on-the-job training or by
going to school. While the latter choice might be viable if she can obtain loans
and low-cost childcare, many parents do not have these opportunities.
V. PARENTS’ PREVIOUS AND NEW FAMILIES
For the most part, the ALI Principles take a conventional position on how
obligations to serial families are treated, except for its treatment of the income of
residential parents’ new partners. In general, the Principles provide that finan-

36. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Balancing the Interests: The American Law Institute’s Treatment of Child
Support, 33 FAM. L.Q. 39, 86 (1999).
37. HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, PRICES, PRODUCTIVITY AND
OTHER LABOR DATA 104 (2d ed. 1998).
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38

cial responsibility to a parent’s first family comes first. Thus, a parent who
owes child support to other children under a prior order is allowed to deduct
the amount actually paid, which is the usual approach to pre-existing child sup39
port duties. In addition, the Principles provide that a parent may take a deduc40
tion for a child from an earlier relationship who lives with him or her, which
41
Since most children live with their
most current guidelines do not allow.
mothers when the family is not intact, the former, traditional provision tends to
favor fathers, and the addition of the latter provision brings mothers into parity
with fathers on this issue.
The Principles are less generous to parents who have additional children
with new partners. They only allow the factfinder to grant such a parent a credit
against expenses incurred in providing for the “basic consumption needs” of the
42
parent’s new children who live with him or her if necessary to avoid hardship.
In determining whether to exercise this discretion, the fact finder is to “compare
the standards of living of the non-residential and residential households, and
should not grant a hardship deduction if the standard of living in the other parent’s household is, or would be by the granting of the deduction, lower than the
43
standard of living in the household of the parent requesting the reduction.”
The Principles generally provide that stepparents do not have support du44
ties, which is consistent with the law in most American jurisdictions today.
However, the treatment of the income of a residential parent’s new spouse or
cohabitant deviates from this approach. As discussed above, most imputed income rules apply to both parents. But Section 3.06 provides that up to half the
income of the residential parent’s spouse or stable cohabiting partner may be
imputed to the residential parent, which would have the effect of lowering the
non-residential parent’s support obligation. The Principles do not, however, al-

38. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.12 cmt. i; see also id. § 3.03 cmt. f (explaining that the
Principles do not take into account the interests of either parent in remarrying).
39. Id. § 3.12(3).
40. Id.
41. Current rules may allow the fact finder to deviate from the presumptive amount of child
support calculated under the jurisdiction’s formula for this reason. See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra
note 29, at 638-51.
42. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.13(1)(c).
43. Id. § 3.13(2).
44. Section 3.02A provides that in “exceptional cases” an adult who is not a child’s legal parent
may be stopped to deny a child support duty. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 5, § 3.02A. This duty
may be warranted if “(a) there was an explicit or implicit agreement or undertaking by the person to
assume a parental-support obligation to the child; (b) the child was born during the marriage or cohabitation of the person and the child’s parent; or (c) the child was conceived pursuant to an agreement between the person and the child’s parent that they would share responsibility for raising the
child and each would be a parent to the child.” Id. § 3.02A(a). Paragraph (b) is not as broad as it
might first appear; subsection 3 of this part provides that “No continuing obligation to support a
child arises merely from a person’s former cohabitation with or marriage to the child’s parent.” Id. §
3.02A(b). The rest of the section and its commentary make clear that the support duty should be imposed only when the would-be obligor’s actions have eliminated or greatly reduced the chance that
support can be obtained from the child’s absent parent. Id. § 3.02A. See generally HARRIS &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 29, at 647-48, 1068-81 (reviewing current general principles regarding stepparents).
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low for the income of the non-residential parent’s partner to be imputed to him,
which would increase the amount of child support owed.
The commentary to Section 3.06 explains this disparate treatment. Recall
that the basic child support formula increases the amount of support by means
of the supplement when the residential parent’s household’s standard of living
will otherwise be substantially lower than that of the non-residential parent’s
45
household. However, since the Principles accept that the non-residential parent
has a superior right to his income and a valid interest in paying no more child
support than he would in the intact household, they argue that it is justifiable to
reduce his child support payments to that level if the standard of living of the
46
child and residential parent rises for any reason. Even though a new spouse or
partner of the residential parent has no legal child support duty, the household’s
47
standard of living may rise because of the new spouse or partner’s income, and
48
therefore the non-residential parent’s support duty may be lowered. Income of
the non-residential parent’s new partner is not imputed because the partner has
no legal child support duty.
VI. ALTERNATIVES—CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE AND EQUAL LIVING STANDARDS
The Principles make very important and valuable contributions to our continuing discussion about child support policy. If implemented, they would increase child support levels for many families, reduce the opportunities for disputes between parents, and enhance the autonomy of parents, especially
residential parents. However, the Principles provide little help to children with
poor non-residential parents, and residential parents who need to work to
maintain a modest standard of living would not be able to take advantage of the
choices the Principles offer.
These shortcomings are not surprising, for they flow from designing child
support rules within the boundaries of existing child support law. Both problems are closely related to the assumptions that support is a private obligation
and that only legal parents have the duty to support children. The ALI’s acceptance of these assumptions should enhance the political acceptability of the Principles. However, I fear that convincing lawmakers to adopt some aspects of the
Principles would actually be fairly difficult, particularly those provisions identified in this commentary as beneficial to residential parents.
Resistance could be expected to the provisions of the Principles that allow
parents to make decisions about childcare, work, and school when the effect of
the decision is to increase the other parent’s obligation. As we have seen,
most—though not all—of these provisions protect the choices of residential parents. This fact increases the likelihood of political resistance because non45. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
46. ALI Principles 1998, supra note 3, § 3.06 cmt. d.
47. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 1, at 79-94; David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic
Parents, and the Law’s Perceptions of “Family” after Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
102, 105 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).
48. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.06 cmt. c.
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residential parents who actually pay money to the other parent would see the
provisions as adversely affecting their interests.
Resistance to provisions intended to increase child support would also be
predictable. Under existing guidelines, payors often complain about child sup49
port being too high. This resistance comes not just from the fathers’ political
action committees but also from the administrators and lawyers who run the
50
system. Academics have also joined in the attack. For example, two recently
published articles challenge the claim that, in many families, non-residential
parents’ standards of living are significantly higher than those of residential
51
parents and children.
The ALI Principles rejected an approach to child support which would
equalize standards of living between households, even though this approach
would better serve children’s interests. The commentary to Section 3.03 explains, “By requiring that the standard of living of the residential parent’s
household be no lower than that of the non-residential parent’s, an equal living
standards measure would effectuate the child’s interest not to bear disproportionately the adverse economic effects of family dissolution. However, it not
only would require that the non-residential parent share income with the child,
but would also often require that the non-residential parent equally share in52
come with the residential parent.”
On the other hand, any child support order involves income sharing between the parents because the residential parent and child live together. The
Principles go further than most existing guidelines by providing for support to
reduce the disparity between the two households’ standards of living. The
question is not whether to make orders on this basis, but to what extent.
Moreover, other provisions of the Principles carry comparison between the two
households’ standards of living further. For example, the provision concerning

49. See, e.g., Robert G. Williams, An Overview of Child Support Guidelines in the United States, in
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: THE NEXT GENERATION 1, 8-9 (Margaret C. Haynes et al. eds., 1994) (explaining that generally the concept of guidelines is accepted, but that it is common for non-custodial
parents to object that the award levels under existing guidelines are too high).
50. For example, after it received recommendations from a national consultant to update the
state’s guidelines, the Oregon drafting committee systematically reduced the amount of child support owed, particularly for lower-income families. See Harris, supra note 9, at 751-52. Oregon family
law lawyers reported that they could never convince clients to accept higher amounts because clients
who received child support rarely complained about awards being too low while non-residential
parents regularly complained about awards being too high. Id. at 756-57.
51. See Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce; Vanishingly Small?,
33 FAM. L.Q. 111 (1999); R. Mark Rogers, Wisconsin-Style and Income Shares Child Support Guidelines:
Excessive Burdens and Flawed Economic Foundation, 33 FAM. L.Q. 135 (1999).
52. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 3, § 3.03 cmt. e. The commentary also argues that an effort
to equalize household incomes would give the residential parent an incentive not to work outside
the home. Id. Another theme that runs through the Principles is that they should not “discourage the
labor force participation or vocational training of either parent.” Id. § 3.03(5). This is identified as
one of the fundamental principles shaping the guidelines. Id. The commentary also argues against
an equal standards of living approach by saying that it would allow the residential parent to diminish her work effort and receive an augmented child support transfer. Conversely, she can increase
her work effort and receive a diminished child support transfer. Id. § 3.03 cmt. k(ii). However, an
equal living standards model can be adapted to address this problem. Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157, 180-81 (1999).
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cases of split-residence states that the child support award should be designed
to reduce significant disparity between the standards of living of the parties’
53
children in their different residences.
However, the equal living standards approach can be criticized for other
reasons. Because it would link the economic fortunes of the households closely,
the occasions for disagreements among the parties could increase. In addition, if
the approach were fully implemented, it would require recalculation of support
duties in both households whenever either household added or lost a member.
Carried to its logical extreme, this approach would result in a myriad of transfers among households with children—with the idea that adults support only
their mates and their legal children lost in the maze.
In a sense, though, this system already exists. Many households pay child
support to one or more other families while receiving support from still others.
The members of each household share the standard of living provided by the in54
come remaining after these transfers. The system is very complicated, creating
transaction costs and opportunities for continued conflict without solving the
problem of childhood poverty. As I and others have argued elsewhere, a publicly-funded child support assurance program, along European lines, is the only
55
universal solution to childhood poverty. This program, which could be supplemented with less onerous child support duties based on legal parenthood,
would be less expensive and would create fewer opportunities for dissension
among the parties. The problem is political—convincing the public to accept
greater collective responsibility to provide for children and their caretakers.
While it may seem unlikely that such a view will be widely accepted soon, it
56
may be worth the political effort to try.

53.
54.

ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 5, § 3.15(1)(b).
Most single parents go on to form new families and take on new dependents. HARRIS &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 29, at 638-39 (citing studies that found most divorced adults, including those
with custody, often remarry).
55. Harris, supra note 9; see also Leslie J. Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 461.
56. Several serious proposals to introduce a national child support assurance program were
made during the 1990s. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW
AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 93-94 (1991); IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD
SUPPORT: AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 45-48 (1992); Stephen D. Sugarman, Reforming Welfare
Through Social Security, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1993).
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